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Watergate and Constitutional Power
A Perspective for United States
v. Nixon
By
William F. Swindler
(Lincoln '58)

The Separation of Powers Tradition
The constitutional crisis of 1973-74
provided, among other things, an ultimate judicial commentary on the principle of separation of powers as enunciated by James Madison in 1788.
Writing in The Federalist, Madison
declared: "unless these departments be
so far connected and blended as to
give each a constitutional control over
the others, the degree of separa-

(

tion . . . essential to a free government,

can never in practice be fully maintained."' This theory of a kind of
contrapuntal political harmony long
awaited, and finally received, a judicial
construction which, if not fully definitive, is at least a more tangible concept
of constitutional law.
In United States v. Nixon,2 the
climax in a series of judicial excursions
into this unexplored territory, the
petition of the Special Prosecutor put
the basic issue as follows:
Whether a claim of executive
privilege based on the generalized
interest in the confidentiality of
government deliberations can block
'The Federalist (Cooke ed., 1961), No. 48.
U.S.L. Wk. 5239 (July 23, 1974).
Cf. also Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F. 2d 700
(1973).
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the prosecution's access to evidence
material and important to the trial
of charges of criminal misconduct

by high government officials who
participated in those deliberations,

particularly where there is a prima
facie showing that the deliberations
occurred in the course of the criminal conspiracy charged in the indictment.4
4

Docket No. 73-1766 (Sp. Ct. Oct. Term
1973). Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
p. 3 .
Fall 1974 * THE BRIEF

15

The unanimous Court answered in the
negative; under the circumstances of
the Watergate affair as it had developed by the early summer of 1974,
the judicial power was "so far connected and blended" with the executive as to give the one "a constitutional control" over the other to prevent the frustration of the essential
functions of the judicial process.
From 1788 to 1974, American constitutional thought had been both uncertain and ambivalent on the matter
of discretionary powers in the executive. At the one end of this time
frame, colonial memory translated
executive discretion into arbitrary
authority; at the other, in 1971, the
Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia reiterated some of this historic conviction when it declared that
no official of the executive branch
could properly be the sole judge of his
own privilege.s In between these
dates, political and judicial commentary has been sparse and rather contradictory. Alexander Hamilton, another
contributor to The Federalist,believed
that the constitutional checks upon
Presidential power were substantially
greater than those upon state governors;6 but a generation later Joseph
Story recognized "incidental powers,
belonging to the executive department, which are necessarily implied
from the nature of the functions
which are confided to it."' Four
times, between 1925 and 1968, the
Supreme Court gave differing statements on the general principle. 8
sCommittee for Nuclear Responsibility v.
Seaborg, 463 F. 2d 788 (1971).
6The Federalist,Nos. 69, 70.
'Commentaries on the Constitution
(1836), III, Sec. 1563.
'Cf. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52
(1925); Humphreys' Exec. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935); Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579 (1952); Wiener v. United States, 357
U.S. 349 (1968).
16
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The issue as it developed in the
Watergate crisis was confused to a
certain degree by a confusion of terms.
English common law and constitutional law have both distinguished
between privilege, which was an insulation from the arbitrary power of the
crown, and prerogative, which in essence was what remained of this power
in the course of parliamentary curtailment. As for the Constitution of the
United States, the term, "privilege,"
appears only in two contexts, and
neither is the context of Aricle II.
Moreover, the original meaning of the
term as used in English law is evident
from these contexts: in one case it
clothes members of Congress with
certain immunities under certain circumstances; 9 in the other case it relates to individual citizens, and there
its conjunctive expression- "privileges
and immunities"-corroborates the
meaning.' 0
As to prerogative, it has been treated as alien to American theory, unless
one accepts as a term of art Holmes'
reference to the courts' "sovereign
prerogative of choice."" Even if the
term be extended to the executive
branch, it still is subject to the English
definition-an authority inherent in
the sovereign. (e.g., executive) until
the legislative branch curtails or extinguishes it. 12 Lord Coke's renowned
aphorism, "the King is under no man,
but under God and the law," is better
phrased in another part of his commentaries: "the King hath no prerogative but that which the law of the land
allows him."" A twentieth-century
' U.S. Const., Art. I, Sec. 6, Cl. 1.
U.S. Const., Art. IV, Sec. 2, Cl. 1; and cf.
Long v.Ansell, 293 U.S. 76, 83 (1934).
" Holmes, Law in Science and Science in
Law, Collected Legal Papers (1920), 239.
12
Cf. Dicey, Law of the Constitution
(1885), 424.
" Case of the Proclamations,(1610) 12 Co.
Rep. 74.
10

English court has reiterated the principle. 14 The common law principlenow potentially, if not actually, applied to American constitutional lawis thus unequivocal: discretionary
power in the executive is continually
subject to legislative and judicial definition and prospective curtailment.

the conflict concerns a non-discretionary matter, e.g., "the obligation of
the President to provide evidence," the
court concluded, the issue of privilege
is irrelevant.17 The Court of Appeals
sustained the District Court, finding
that "a limited requirement that the
President produce material evidence ...

First Judicial Test:
The Grand Jury Subpoena

In midsummer 1973 the Watergate
grand jury in the District of Columbia
issued its historic subpoena for certain
White House tape recordings and related documents. The subpoena was
necessarily directed to the President,
said Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox
in the petition for a show cause order,
"because the President took the unusual step of assuming sole personal
custody . . . once the existence of the

evidence was admitted." This circumstance in turn led White House counsel
Charles Alan Wright to declare that
"the President has an absolute right to
withhold material evidence merely by
his own ipse dixit whenever he asserts
that non-disclosure would be in the
public interest and even though he has
a personal and private interest in the
question."' 5
The District Court rejected the
White House argument: "Executive
flat is not the mode of resolution of a
conflict of views over the scope of
executive privilege."" Indeed, where
"Attorney General v. DeKeyster's Royal
Hotel, Ltd., (1920) A.C. 508.
Is Verified Petition for an Order, etc., In re
Grand Jury Subpoena, Misc. Docket No.
42-73, U.S. District Court for District of
Columbia, July 26, 1973, p. 21.
6
1 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 360 F. S. 1, 6
(1973).

is required by law, and by

the rule that even the Chief Executive
is subject to the mandate of the law
when he has no valid claim of privilege." 18
If privilege is in fact relevant, the
Court of Appeals disposed of the
White House argument with little hesitation: "Sovereignty remains at all
times with the people, and they do not
forfeit through elections the right to
have the law construed against and
applied to every citizen."1 9 Further,
the court declared, it is not to be
assumed that "an act is discretionary
merely because the President is the
actor," 20 and if discretion equates
with privilege, "the courts have repeatedly asserted that the applicability of
the privilege is in the end for them and
not the Executive to decide." 2 1
In the context of the special circumstances of the grand jury subpoena
of 1973, the appellate opinion in
Nixon v. Sirica established at least two
principles: (1) executive privilege is
confined exclusively to discretionary
actions, and (2) the determination of
whether a particular action is discretionary lies with the judiciary. Correlatively, the opinion, corroborating the
District Court holding, makes clear
that where an action is non-discretionary the executive is subject to

"Id., n. 21.
"Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F. 2d 700, 722
(1973).
'9 Id., at 711.
20
d., at 712.
21 Id., at 713.
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The bill became law without Presidential signature-another rare constitutional procedure-and the Select Committee promptly issued a large number
of new subpoenas for White House
Second Judicial Test:
tapes and other records. Paradoxically,
The Senate Subpoenas
however, once the jurisdictional statute had been passed, neither the Senate Committee nor later the House
While the judicial branch thus con- Judiciary Committee showed any great
firmed its own power to compel exec- interest in renewing the judicial test.
utive compliance, the initial efforts to Aware that time was running against
enforce subpoenas undertaken by the the executive, the legislative branch
Senate Select Committee on Presiden- elected
to let the Special Prosecutor,
tial Campaign Activities (the Ervin
now Leon Jaworski, and the courts do
Committee) were dismissed by the their work
for them on the assumption
District Court with prejudice. 23 Treat(which turned out to be correct) that
ing the Select Committee's motion for
relevant materials would in due course
summary judgement as a civil com- make their way from the judiciary
to
plaint, and therefore raising the thresthe legislative.
hold issue of jurisdiction, the court reThis course of Congressional policy
jected the arguments for a valid statuwas, from a constitutional viewpoint,
tory (n.b., not constitutional) basis for
the most unsatisfactory feature of the
jurisdiction as asserted by counsel for
great Watergate crisis: it left com24
the Committee.
Suggesting that the
pletely unresolved the question of the
court was being requested "to invoke a
extent of Congressional power in referjurisdiction which only Congress can
ence to Madison's theory of interdegrant but which Congress has heretopendent government powers. After a
fore withheld," the opinion declined
tentative movement in the direction of
to reach the merits but at the same
judicial
definition, Congress elected to
time sent a clear signal to Congress
restrict
itself to political procedures.
itself.
There
were
doubtless many explanaReading the signal, Congress
tions:
by
early
1974 the Senate Select
promptly enacted legislation vesting in
Committee
was
beginning to wind
the District Court the specific jurisdicdown
its
activity
at
the same time that
tion it complained that it lacked.
the House Judiciary Committee was
warming to its own task; the sensa22 "We
note ... that courts have assumed
tional gaps and discrepancies in tapes
that they have the power to enter manda- submitted to the grand jury by White
tory orders to Executive officials to com- House counsel, now James St. Clair,
pel production of evidence. While a claim
and the oncoming trials of certain
of absolute Executive immunity may not
have been raised directly in these courts, Watergate defendants all played a part
there is no indication that they enter- in dissipating efforts to achieve a
tained any doubts of their power." Id., at definitive constitutional statement on
714, citing Environmental Protection legislative subpoena authority in this
Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 93 (1973).
context.
"Application

judicial process to compel proper compliance. 2

of Senate Select Committee,
etc., 361 F. S. 1282 (1973).
Id., at 1283.
2sAct of December 3, 1973, P. L. 93-190
(93rd Cong., 1st Sess.).
24
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Obiter: The Agnew Case

The collateral constitutional crisis
revolving about Vice-President Spiro
T. Agnew brought to the fore even
more ambivalent Article II matters,
which nonetheless have contributed to
the considerations which must go into
an ultimate definition of executive
privilege and its limitations. First, was
the question of the true nature of the
vice presidential office per se-was it
analogous, so to speak, to an estate in
being or an estate in expectancy?
Second, did any privilege in the executive office, and specifically in the
Chief Executive, extend to one whose
only express constitutional function is
to be designated to succeed to the
Presidency in the event of a vacancy?
In the alternative, was the VicePresident, as the presiding officer of
the Senate, subject to the general
provisions of Article I (including Congressional privilege) rather than to the
concept of privilege under Article II
upon which the White House was
relying?
The proceedings of the grand jury
impaneled and sitting in Maryland 26
involved prospective criminal action
against the Vice-President, and Mr.
Agnew's counsel undertook to argue
that either as an executive officer in
futuro or as a legislative officer de
facto, the Vice-President was immune
from criminal process until removed
from office by impeachment, resignation, or expiration of his term. 27
While counsel relied on the language of
the Impreachment Clause28 to support this argument, it was further
26

Application of Spiro T. Agnew, In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, Civil Docket No.
73-965 (October 10, 1973).
2
'Memorandum in Support of Motion, id.,
September 28, 1973.
2 U.S. Const., Art. II, Sec. 4.

contended that one officer of the
executive department-the Attorney
General-ought not to be heard to
charge criminally another member of
the executive branch. Indeed, the language of the memorandum referring to
this policy consideration strikingly
illustrated the ricocheting problems of
an administration already beginning to
disintegrate: "The Framers [of the
Constitution] could scarcely have intended that the President should have
the power forthwith to incapacitate
his rival effectively by a unilateral
judgement of the Attorney General,
the President's direct appointee.' 29
It is worth noting that an analogous
argument was advanced by Mr. St.
Clair in United States v. Nixon, the
contention being that the courts lacked jurisdiction over an "internal dispute of a co-equal branch."o St.
Clair's brief also challenged the Watergate grand jury's naming of the President as an unindicted co-conspirator3 -another novel and, indeed, unprecedented procedural step which the
Supreme Court declined to consider.,
holding it to have been improvidently
brought. 32 For any collateral legal
argument on these matters, students of
the constitutional issues are thrown
back upon the Agnew case. There the
responding memorandum of the Department of Justice emphasized the
limitation of privilege to Article I,
called attention to the unimpaired
constitutional status of the VicePresident Aaron Burr while subject to
indictment in two states,3 3 and suggested that immunity was to be implied only if subjecting a government
29 Loc.

cit. n. 26 supra, at p. 18.
soDocket Nos. 73-1766 and 73-1834 (Sp.
Ct., October Term 1973). Brief for Respondent, pp. 27-44.
31
Id., at 115-122.
3242 U.S.L. Wk. 5237, n. 2.
"Cf. United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 30
(Case No. 14,692d) (1807).
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officer to criminal process would sub- to the first of these, Chief Justice
stantially impair his official func- Burger stated unequivocally: "The mere
tions. 4 But this whole matter was assertion of a claim of an 'intra-branch
mooted when, on October 10, 1973, dispute,' without more, has never
the Vice-President appeared in the operated to defeat federal jurisdiction;
District Court in Baltimore to enter his justiciability does not depend upon
plea of nolo contendere, at the same

time resigning his office.

The Final Judicial Test:
The Nixon Case

such a surface inquiry." In any event,
the Chief Justice continued, an administrative regulation denying interposition of executive privilege in the case

of the Special Prosecutor3 7 was a rule
which the United States itself, "as the
sovereign composed of the three
branches," is bound to enforce.
At the heart of the matter, and
extending back to Madison's inter-

Against the background of the respective judicial tests of grand jury and
Congressional subpoena powers, the
collateral question of Vice-Presidential
status, the Senate committee investigation of Watergate and related political
issues, and the House Judiciary hearings on impeachment, the final test of
intergovernmental powers began on
April 18, 1974 with the issuing of a
subpoena duces tecum by Judge John
Sirica's court for the District of
Columbia.35 The subpoena was issued
in the case of United States v. Mitchell

et al., then involving seven former
officials of the White House Staff or
the Committee for the Reelection of
the President.3 6
On appeal from the subpoena
order, the Supreme Court in United
States v. Nixon concerned itself with

two overriding considerations: justiciability and the claim of privilege. As

dependency principle, was the definition of executive privilege or discretionary power. As to this, the Court
declared at the outset:
In the performance of assigned
constitutional duties each branch of
the Government must initially
interpret the Constitution, and the
interpretation of its powers by any
branch is due great respect from the
others.

20
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. Many decisions of this

To this the Court added:
However, neither the doctrine of
separation of powers, nor the need
for confidentiality of high level
communications, without more,

'Memorandum for the United States Concerning the Vice-President's Claim of Constitutional Immunity, loc. cit. n. 26 supra.

s Loc. cit. n. 30 supra. Brief for the United
States, p. 1.
-42 U.S.L. Wk., 5239, n. 3. One defendant,
Charles Colson, pleaded guilty to a lesser
charge and was removed from this group
of defendants.

. .

Court, however, have unequivocally
reaffirmed the holding of Marbury
v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803),
that "it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."Id., at
177.
... Since this Court has consistently exercised the power to construe and delineate claims arising
under express powers, it must follow that the Court has authority to
interpret claims with respect to
powers alleged to derive from enumerated powers.39

Fed. Reg. 30739.
342 U.S.L. Wk. 5240-41.
338
39

Id., at 5243.

can sustain an absolute, unqualified
presidential privilege of immunity
from judicial process under all circumstances ...
The impediment that an absolute, unqualified privilege would
place in the way of the primary
constitutional duty of the Judicial
Branch to do justice in criminal
prosecutions would plainly conflict
with the function of the courts
under Article III.4
From this the holding inexorably
followed:
In this case the President challenges a subpoena served on him as
a third party requiring the production of materials for use in a criminal prosecution on the claim that
he has a privilege against disclosure
of confidential communications ...
We conclude that when the
ground for asserting privilege as to
subpoenaed materials sought for
use in a criminal trial is based only
on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over
the fundamental demands of due
process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice . . .41

and cannot conform to . .. single Articles torn from context . . . Presidential

powers are not fixed but fluctuate,
depending upon their disjunction or
conjunction with those of Congress." 43 The Steel Seizure Case, in
which Jackson made his comment,
established the judicial requirement
that, at least in domestic matters,
Presidential discretion was subject to
Congressional guidelines. The case of
United States v. Nixon now has added
the proposition that the discretion is
subject to judicial review.

Summary and Moral

In 1956 Presidential historian Clinton Rossiter wrote, concerning "occasional abuses of power:"
The President is in position to do
serious damage, if not irreparable

injury, to the ideals and methods of
American democracy. Power that
can be used decisively can also be

Thus, at length, the nature and
condition of Article II discretionary
power has been judicially suggested;
the Burger opinion stresses the exceptional circumstances under which the
power may be judicially limited, but
equally important, it judicially recognizes the existence of the power. As
Justice Holmes once stated in another
context, "a power which must belong
to and somewhere reside in every
civilized government" must ultimately
be found within the sense of the
Or, as Justice Jackson
Constitution.
observed in 1952, "the art of governing under our Constitution does not
40

Id., at 5244.

41Id., at 5246.
42

Cf. MiSsouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416,
417 (1920).

abused grossly. No man can hold

such a concentration
without feeling the
though the urge be
patriotic, to push it

of authority
urge, even
honest and
beyond its

usual bounds. We must therefore

consider carefully the various safeguards that are counted upon to
keep the President's feet in paths of
constitutional righteousness ...
Blended

together

in

judicious

amounts, powers and limits make
up a constitution, and the Presidency is nothing if not a constitu-

tional office. Its powers are huge,
but they are of no real effect-they
43

Concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. at 634
(1952).
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are not, strictly speaking, powers at
all-unless exercised through constitutional forms and within constitutional limits."
Discretion in the executive, in other
words, is discretion in the use of
discretion itself. To paraphrase a familiar judicial aphorism, the only ultimate
curb on executive discretion is the
executive's own sense of restraint."
Or, as has been more recently stated,
''executive privilege is at most what
the words suggest-a privilege or option the President has, and not a duty.
There is no requirement that it be
asserted . ..

[R] ather, it stands more

to be thrown into disrepute by its
selective use, as in the Watergate affairs, when it has the appearance of a
cover-up."
Executive privilege or prerogative,
accordingly, is an option the American
people will tolerate to the degree that
they are persuaded that it is being
responsibly used. This, in turn, rests
largely upon the personal capacity of
the President to inspire confidence and
trust. There is danger of self-delusion,
of course, in cases of executives endowed with the personal magnetism
which it has become fashionable to
call charisma-charisma being defined,
in this instance, as the quality of
goodness or even greatness which the
observer persuades himself his subject
must possess to be as believable as he
is. Thomas Carlyle saw virtue in this
type of hero-worship; 7 the modern
American, particularly after the
denouement of the summer of 1974, is
currently cynical about the matter.
4 Rossiter, The American Presidency
(1956), 33-34.
45 Cf. Stone, J., dissenting in United States
v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 87 (1936).
1 Van Alstyne, "President Nixon: Toughing
It Out With the Law," 59 A.B.A.J.
1398-99 (December 1973).
47
Cf. London & Westminster Review, No.
12 (1838).
22
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Dettness and restraint, nevertheless,
will remain the touchstones for the
effective use of Presidential power of
all types. While it is true that the
President is ultimately responsible to
the electorate rather than to Congress, 4 8 any legislative power exercised by the President "must stem
either from an act of Congress or from
the Constitution itself." 49 And as
Chief Justice Burger put it: "A President and those who assist him must be
free to explore alternatives in the
process of shaping policies and making
decisions and to do so in a way many
would be unwilling to express except
privately. These are the considerations
justifying a presumptive privilege for
presidential communications." To
which he added: "But this presumptive privilege must be considered in
light of our historic commitment to
the rule of law."so
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952).
9
4 Id., at 585.
so42 U.S.L. Wk. 5245.
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